Given the ideal conditions used in constructing empirical mathematical laws, one finds and should expect that the values deduced from such laws (C−values) will not agree with the measured values for the same variable (O−values). These conditions are constitutive of such laws, and the latter are acceptable only if their O and C−value differences can be explained in terms of the factors idealized. A conception of realism emerges where the laws are true but misrepresent reality, have false C−value predictions, are not accepted because of their truth or approximate truth, and are acceptable only if the differences are explained.
1.
This paper is concerned with the mathematical laws/theories of empirical science.
We begin with van Fraassen's portrayal of scientific realism: "Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves belief that it is true." (1980, 8) Of this portrayal, van Fraassen says that
"it is quite minimal, and can be agreed to by anyone who considers himself a scientific realist." (1980, 8) I am one scientific realist who cannot agree with this portrayal. But before we proceed, we must settle an issue that might derail the project before it gets a fair hearing.
The realist position developed in this paper comes about through the recognition of the role of ideal conditions in scientific theorizing. This is best seen through an example in which I make a distinction between mathematical laws and their equations.
Thus, the ideal gas equation is: PV =RT. 1 But the ideal gas law is more than this equation. Many idealizing assumptions known to be false are used in constructing or deriving the ideal gas law (and hence its equation). Some of the assumptions for the molecules of a gas in a given container are: (G1) The molecules are perfectly spherical; It should be clear from (2) that I take the idealizing conditions to be constitutive of the laws and theories for which they are invoked. Such conditions, when expressed in the form of singular statements, are known to be false. For example, the statement that the molecules in this container here and now are perfectly spherical is false. Also, the idealizing predicates occurring in the antecedent of the generalized conditional are unsatisfied, e.g., 'x is a perfectly spherical molecule'. Because of the material conditional, a generalized conditional with at least one idealizing predicate in its antecedent is true in elementary logic. Thus, mathematical laws of empirical science on this account are generalized conditionals that are true and known to be so prior to any testing. 3
And so the potentially derailing issue here is whether it is appropriate to take the mathematical laws, as opposed to the equations, to be (vacuously) true. Some will prefer to pursue a relevance logic here, while others will want to pursue theories for counterfactual conditionals. I have chosen neither of the latter approaches, and instead have decided to take as the project one of determining when to accept and when to reject the vacuously true mathematical laws. I suspect that the task of finding criteria for accepting or rejecting the vacuously true laws is an easier one than that of building a general relevance logic or a general counterfactual theory because of the restriction in scope. I also suspect that any criteria I might offer in my project will very likely have to be respected by either of the other two attempts at theories. For example, in the absence of a counterfactual theory, I am betting that my acceptable vacuous mathematical laws will serve as a basis for intuitively acceptable counterfactuals.
Scientists reason from false assumptions in conjunction with asserted premises to derive the false equations. When they are done with their derivations, the conclusions that they validly draw are conditional in form. This is the way valid reasoning from assumptions works. That the conditionals can be vacuously true should be no surprise.
If so, the question becomes: When are the resulting vacuously true generalized conditionals acceptable?
3. Now assume that the above analysis for mathematical laws is correct. Then, contrary to many realists, one should not take the ideal gas law to be approximately true.
Instead, it is true and known to be so before any testing takes place. Also contrary to van Fraassen one should not accept (2) above because it is true; nor does it make any sense to accept this true generalization because it is approximately true. But while it is also clear that one could say that the equations of empirical science are false, following Cartwright (1983) , from my perspective it is better to say that the calculated values ("C− Here then is the scientific realist position I wish to develop: (1) The mathematical laws/theories of science are true and known to be so prior to testing them; (2) the equations of science are false and known to be so prior to testing them; (3) the mathematical laws are deliberately constructed so as to misrepresent reality, i.e., they are not attempts to provide a literally true story; (4) the laws/theories are true, but they are not accepted because they are true; (5) there is no role for approximate truth; (6) the aim of testing is not to falsify; it is to determine how large the expected differences are between the values of the predictions and the measurements for the same variable; (7) it is a major goal of science to justifiably explain these differences; (8) being able to explain these differences is the basis for acceptance of laws/theories that generate them.
One may now understand how to take such laws to be true and yet maintain that where the mathematics will "work", the scientist does not lose sight of what has been idealized, since it is these idealized factors that are the first court of appeal in explaining the expected differences. 5
For example, suppose that we use O−value inputs for V and T of a gas and calculate the output C−value for P. Call the calculated value for P, Pc, and the measured value, Po. The scientist expects that the absolute value of the difference between Pc and Po will not be equal to 0: |Pc − Po| > 0. He is now asked to explain why this is the case.
He says that as long as we ignore the actual volumes of the molecules that we can expect a difference. The existence of the actual volumes of the molecules explains in part why |Pc − Po| > 0.
And so it does not seem quite right to say that science aims for a literally true 5 They are not the only court of appeal, however.
story. In the face of too many factors, difficulty with units, etc., perhaps one should see the goal to be one of computable functions based on ideal conditions. But if this is so, then why should anyone, Cartwright included 6 , want to ignore the ideal conditions and their role in theorizing? More importantly, how does one know when a true idealized law is acceptable? Instead of the latter question, however, the question standardly asked is when are the false equations acceptable.
4.
The false equations are standardly taken to be acceptable only if the results are "close enough". Instead of "close enough" Giere uses the term 'similar' when he states that the real system must be "similar to the proposed model in specified respects and to specified degrees." (1985, 80 ) While Giere's talk of similarity seems to be a form of hand−waving (see below), even so, the question for him and everyone else is: When are the C and O−values close enough? Certain approximate truth approaches will try to specify in general when the |O − C| interval is "small enough" so that one is justified in saying that the theory/law that entails the C−values in question is approximately true. 7
Of structuralist approaches to specifying such intervals Jeff Ramsey says that "when it
comes to specifying what counts as an acceptable range of discrepancy, structuralists resort to hand−waving and vague generalities." (1992, 155) I would agree with Ramsey and go further and say that there is no manner of knowing independent of the theory/law at issue when an interval is close enough. There is, however, a general principle, not recognized by Ramsey or (as far as I know ) any other philosopher, that does come into 6 In Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement Cartwright seems by implication to take the ideal conditions to be constitutive of the laws, since she here (1989, 204) proclaims Leszek Nowak's method of concretion to be the method of science. Nowak (1972 Nowak ( , 1980 Nowak ( , 1992 does take the ideal conditions to be constitutive of the laws. 7 See, for example, Niiniluoto (1984 Niiniluoto ( , 1987 .
play in actual scientific practice in connection with the question. 8
5.
The principle is: (I) For any O and C−value pair, an |O − C| difference is "close enough" iff one can provide a complete and epistemically justified explanation for why |O − C| > 0. Having rejected truth a la van Fraassen or approximate truth as a reason for accepting an idealized law/theory, we now have through (I) above a reason for acceptance: (II) A true idealized law or theory is acceptable iff its |O − C| differences can be completely and justifiably explained. Now (II) may be too strong, i.e., we may only want to have a necessary condition for acceptance. But one thing that the history of science surely demonstrates is that if one cannot completely and justifiably explain the differences, then the law or theory is in trouble. And so philosophers of science, in the grip perhaps of the deductive nomological conception of explanation, have failed to recognize one of the most significant facts in need of explaining, namely, the differences between the O and C− values. Hence, the subtitle of this essay.
6.
We now examine the type of explanation in question and one method whereby one can provide epistemic justification for claiming to have explained the differences in whole or in part. The ideal gas law falsely assumes that the values for the molecular volumes of a gas do not affect the values for V, P, or T. Assume that we have a C−value for pressure of Pc and an O−value of Po, where |Po − Pc| > 0. Why is there this difference between these two values? In effect, it was Clausius who said that it was because we have neglected, among other factors, the actual volumes of the molecules in 8 I here assert that error measurement theory alone will not provide one with the resources to completely explain the |O − C| differences. A number of philosophers hold this position, notably, Ramsey (1992) , Nowak (1972 Nowak ( , 1980 Nowak ( , 1992 , Cartwright (1983 Cartwright ( , 1989 , and Laymon (1985 Laymon ( , 1989 ; so I will not argue the point here the container with our idealization about negligible volumes. Clausius reasoned that the volume occupied by a gas should not be taken to be the volume of the container V, but that it should be the volume available to a single molecule, 8.
Here is a fictionalized schematic account of the elements of theorizing using the ideal gas law. Assume that Mary believes that the pressure of a gas is affected by its volume and temperature and that she has units for these magnitudes. She also believes that the volumes of the molecules (F1), attractive forces between them (F2), shapes of the molecules (F3), and imperfectly elastic collisions (F4) are also factors that affect the values of P, V, and T. She tries to construct as accurate a computable function as possible by idealizing the factors other than P, V, and T. In a sense she is maintaining (outside of measurement error), then she should be able to justifiably and completely explain the differences. She sees that her ideal conditions are relevant only if the factors 11 I note that Ramsey (1992) also does not see the goal as one of explaining the differences, although he does see the need to epistemically justify what he calls the "approximations", i.e., my C and O−value differences. 12 Lest some may think either Nowak's or my position are akin to Laymon's (1985 Laymon's ( , 1989 , then one should note my formalization of Laymon's sequences:
The important thing to notice is that T remains constant in his sequences and is not known to be (vacuously) true prior to testing. Increasing accuracy in the sequence confirms that the unchanging T is true; while failure to increase accuracy confirms that T is false. Note also that Laymon only talks about replacing ideal conditions with more realistic ones and he thus does not talk about dropping them without replacement. And so I1 goes to I1' for Laymon, while for Nowak I1 is simply dropped. Laymon also does not explicitly require that a correction be made when he replaces one ideal condition with a more realistic one. Thus, just about any T can be disconfirmed by moving from, e.g., 'the molecules are perfectly spherical' to 'the molecules are nearly spherical', where without any corrections we do not get greater accuracy. Also, Laymon repeatedly takes an equation or conjunction of equations to be a theory. Now either these equations are asserted conditionally on the basis of their ideal conditions or they are not. If they are, then the result is true. If they are not, then they are false and known to be so prior to testing. Thus, Laymon misconceives the process as one where we need to find out whether a given T is true or false. Space forbids my arguing these points here, but hopefully one understands why I maintain that Laymon's position is very different from that of Nowak (and also my position) and that what he needs to recognize is that the ideal conditions are constitutive of the laws, and that the goal is to explain the differences.
they idealize exist and explain the differences at least in part.
What this fictional account reveals is an element of theorizing that seems to be missing in this day of treating theories as models of real systems. What is missing is the characterization of the real system modeled. In the above, this characterization is given in terms of a non−computable function or list. 13 If one takes such "lists" to be elements in theory construction, then one will want lists that have all and only relevant factors on them. The statement describing such a list will not be taken to be approximately true.
Instead, it may be taken to be false because incomplete. Or it may be considered false because it has factors on it that are irrelevant or do not exist. Importantly, an underlying element of theorizing for a mathematical law/theory may be seen to be a list or a statement describing the list. The latter will be a kind of statement of relevance. 14 We will want a "literally true story" for this list and we will accept the statement describing the list in part because it is true. For example, no matter what equations one might set forth, phlogiston theory is false because there is no phlogiston; caloric theory is false because there is no caloric substance.
9.
van Fraassen does not take such lists or their characterizations to be elements of theorizing. Nor, for that matter, do many realists. 15 van Fraassen's "minimalist" portrayal of realism "accidentally" works for lists; but it does not fit the idealized laws constructed from such lists. To the eight principles given above characterizing my kind 13 This I came to independently of Nowak's use of what he calls the "image" of the law or theory. The latter is quite literally a kind of list of factors taken to be relevant to a given magnitude, where Nowak treats some of these factors as primary, e.g., P, V, T, and others as secondary. See Nowak (1980) . It is interesting that Cartwright has also now taken to talking about lists for idealized and abstract laws or theories, apparently under Nowak's influence. (1989, 207) 14 Mill's method of concomitant variation might form the basis for explicating the kind of relevance at issue. 15 Nowak (1980) and now maybe Cartwright (1989) are exceptions.
of scientific realism, we now add: (9) the mathematical laws are constructed on the basis of lists of factors taken to be relevant to each other; (10) an ideal condition In for such laws is taken to be relevant only if the factor Fn that it idealizes exists and plays the appropriate explanatory role. These ten conditions do truly provide a different conception of scientific realism, without appealing to "approximate truth"; they show that science does and should aim at explaining the differences. Perhaps more importantly for the realism debate, why is one C−value taken to be more accurate than another? I hope that one will now see that these differences will be accounted for in part in terms of the ideal conditions invoked in the different equations used to get the C−values. 
